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Non-Traditional Activism
USING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS TO URGE LGBT NONDISCRIMINATION PROTECTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Apache Corporation (“Apache”) is an energy company that does
business across the world.1 Until recently, Apache’s non-discrimination
policy allowed discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity.2 In October 2007, several Apache shareholders, all New
York City pension funds (“The Funds”),3 sought to correct this blatant
disregard for civil rights by submitting a proposal for Apache’s 2008
annual shareholder meeting.4 The proposal asked the company to
“implement equal employment opportunity policies based on [ten]
principles prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gender identity.”5 The principles listed in the proposal are those that
several other Fortune 500 corporations have used when implementing
their non-discrimination policies.6 The Funds argued that if these non1

Apache Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 29, 2008).
Apache Corp. v. New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys., No. H-08-1064, 2008 WL
1821728, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2008).
3
Id. at *1. The five funds were the New York City Employees’ Retirement System,
New York City Teachers’ Retirement System, New York City Police Pension Fund, New York City
Fire Department Pension Fund, and New York City Board of Education Retirement System. Id.
4
Id. The proposal was submitted through the funds’ custodian and trustee. Id. The
Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York was the trustee and custodian for all of the funds
except that the Comptroller is only the custodian of the New York City Board of Education
Retirement System. Id. at *1 n.1.
5
Id. at *2.
6
Id. The proposal stated:
2

1) Discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity will be prohibited in
the company’s employment policy statement. 2) The company’s non-discrimination
policy will be distributed to all employees. 3) There shall be no discrimination based on
any employee’s actual or perceived health condition, status, or disability. 4) There shall
be no discrimination in the allocation of employee benefits on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity. 5) Sexual orientation and gender identity issues will be
included in corporate employee diversity and sensitivity programs. 6) There shall be no
discrimination in the recognition of employee groups based on sexual orientation or
gender identity. 7) Corporate advertising policy will avoid the use of negative stereotypes
based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 8) There shall be no discrimination in
corporate advertising and marketing policy based on sexual orientation or gender identity.
9) There shall be no discrimination in the sale of goods and services based on sexual
orientation or gender identity, and 10) There shall be no policy barring on corporate
charitable contributions to groups and organizations based on sexual orientation.
Id.
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discrimination policies were implemented, Apache shareholders would
benefit from the company’s improved recruitment and retention of
employees, increased employee morale and productivity, lowered
litigation costs, and strengthened corporate reputation.7
But Apache did not want its shareholders to vote on the proposal
and sought to exclude the proposal from its proxy materials.8 On January
3, 2008, Apache asked the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
“Commission”) to issue a no-action letter9 on the grounds that the
proposal related to the company’s ordinary business operations and
therefore could be excluded from Apache’s proxy materials under Rule
14a-8(i)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 The Commission
granted Apache’s request, stating that the Commission would not pursue
enforcement actions against Apache if it excluded the proposal because
there was “some basis” for Apache’s view that the proposal could be
excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).11 Shortly thereafter, Apache mailed its
proxy materials to its shareholders without the proposal.12 On April 8,
2008, Apache sought a declaratory judgment13 in the Southern District of
Texas that it properly excluded the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).14 In
Apache Corp. v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, the court
held that Apache properly excluded the shareholder proposal from its
proxy statement because four of the proposal’s principles, those relating
to advertising, marketing, sale of goods and services, and charitable
contributions, did not, in their view, “implicate the social policy
underlying the Proposal . . . [and sought to] micromanage the company
to an unacceptable degree.”15
The Apache case is a recent illustration of shareholders’ concern
about lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”)16 rights and is an
example of the types of non-discrimination proposals that are submitted
by shareholders attempting to induce corporations to change their
policies to include such protections.
7

Id.
See Apache Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 615894, at *1 (Mar. 5, 2008)
[hereinafter Apache No-Action Letter]. For an explanation of how a company can be excused from
sending a shareholder proposal to its other shareholders, see infra Part II.A.
9
For an explanation of no-action letters, see infra Part II.A.
10
17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(7); Apache, 2008 WL 1821728, at *2.
11
17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(7); Apache Letter, supra note 8, at *1.
12
Apache, 2008 WL 1821728, at *3.
13
It is unclear why Apache filed for declaratory judgment. It may be because the funds
filed suit in the Southern District of New York claiming that Apache’s exclusion was improper.
Apache may have thought that the Fifth Circuit may have been a more receptive forum for their
argument. The New York suit was stayed pending the declaratory action in Texas. Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at *6-*8.
16
“LGBT” is an acronym commonly used to refer to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender individuals. The term “LGBT non-discrimination” will be used throughout this Note to
refer to policies or laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity and expression.
8
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It is also an example of an innovative and non-traditional
weapon in civil rights activists’ arsenal because The Funds seem to have
won the war. Shortly after the court’s decision in Apache’s favor, the
company changed its non-discrimination policy to protect against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.17
And the same thing has happened at other companies.18 In 2008, almost
forty similar shareholder proposals were filed against companies like
Apache, but shareholders only voted on fourteen.19 This is because
companies are “eager to avoid a proxy fight on this issue[,]” choosing
instead to negotiate with shareholders in implementing LGBT nondiscrimination policies.20
And even when shareholders do vote, LGBT non-discrimination
proposals historically receive high votes.21 The two highest shareholder
votes on all 2008 proposals were LGBT non-discrimination proposals,
each receiving over 52% of the shareholder vote.22 In all of these
instances, shareholder activists have used a non-traditional mechanism to
urge LGBT non-discrimination.
But shareholders cannot count on a company’s acquiescence,
and companies like Apache often fight the proposals.23 When that
happens, activists’ endeavors are hampered by the Commission and some
courts. This Note argues that the Commission and the Southern District
of Texas responded incorrectly to the proposal and its litigation. Contrary
to the Commission and court rulings, shareholder proposals seeking nondiscrimination protections based on sexual orientation and gender
identity and expression should not fall under Rule 14a-8(i)(7)’s ordinary
business exclusion and companies should be required to include them in
their proxy materials when requested to do so by shareholders.
Part II of this Note describes the shareholder proposal process
and introduces shareholder proposals that seek non-discrimination
policies based on sexual orientation and gender identity and expression.
Part III then discusses the reasons why these proposals should not fall
under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). It concludes that they raise significant social
policy issues about which shareholders are able and entitled to make an
informed judgment.

17

See APACHE CORPORATION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION POLICY (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.apachecorp.com/content/released/
Apache_EEO.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
18
MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY SEASON PREVIEW 2009, at 6, 16 (2009),
available at http://www.asyousow.org/csr/proxy-preview-2009.shtml (follow “Download” hyperlink).
19
Id. at 3.
20
Id. at 16.
21
See id. at 3.
22
Id.
23
See id. at 16. For example, in 2009, ExxonMobile is facing its tenth LGBT nondiscrimination proposal. Id. at 16. In 2008, the proposal drew a 40% shareholder vote. Id.
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BACKGROUND

The extent to which shareholders can control or influence the
management of the corporations in which they invest is a prominent
issue in corporate law.24 Under statutory default rules, the board of
directors controls the company, including hiring managers to run the
day-to-day operations.25 Generally, shareholders have no rights to
directly control or influence the corporation.26
Despite default statutes, shareholders want—and do have—some
ability to influence corporations. This influence is important because all
shareholders are concerned about the company’s management since they
have a stake in the company.27 Individual investors are often “rationally
apathetic” about the management of a corporation—since they only own
a small amount of shares, there are few incentives for them to fight for
changes in management.28 On the other hand, institutional investors,29
such as The Funds in the Apache case, often own a large amount of
shares of a single corporation and therefore have a greater incentive to
express their opinions and usually have the resources to make their
opinions known to management.30 Shareholders are concerned about
discrimination issues because of the high costs associated with the
corporation being branded “discriminatory,” including lawsuit damages
and reputational harm.31
24

See, e.g., Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1954) (shareholders wanted the
president to be reinstated after he was dismissed by the board of directors).
25
See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2009).
26
Id. Default rules can be changed in an individual corporation by adding specific
shareholder rights in the company’s certificate of incorporation. Id.
27
See Patricia Uhlenbrock, Note, Roll Out the Barrel: The SEC Reverses Its Stance on
Employment-Related Shareholder Proposals under Rule 14a-8—Again, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 277, 279
(2000).
28
Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
407, 417 (2006).
Because each individual shareholder owns only a very small percentage of the
outstanding shares of a corporation, she does not have a stake sufficient to make
monitoring worthwhile. After all, becoming informed is costly; it is also futile, because
one shareholder’s meager vote is unlikely to affect the outcome. Thus, shareholders tend
to be rationally apathetic and support the incumbent board on the theory that the directors
are experts and have access to greater information.
Id.

29

Examples of institutional investors include pension funds, hedge funds, private equity
funds, and foreign governments. Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 278 n.10.
The stock market has had a long history of shareholder passivity, but this is likely a thing
of the past. The rise of the institutional investor and the increased knowledge of
stockholders as a whole is forcing an increased accountability to shareholders for many
boards of directors. As a result, the demands of the Teamsters in its case against Fleming
is something courts may encounter with increasing frequency in the years to come.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907, 909 (Okla. 1999).
30
Velasco, supra note 28, at 425-26.
31
See Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 278.
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One way in which shareholders can exercise influence over a
corporation is through shareholder proposals. A shareholder proposal is a
shareholder’s “recommendation or requirement that the company and/or
its board of directors take action” that the shareholder intends to present
at the company’s annual shareholder meeting.32 These proposals allow
shareholders a platform for voicing their concerns or suggestions about
the company to fellow shareholders.33
Shareholders have the right to submit proposals independently,
by sending their proposals to other shareholders themselves.34 Since the
cost of sending their own proposals is often prohibitively high,
shareholders rarely choose this option.35
Instead, shareholders prefer to use Rule 14a-8 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193436 to submit their proposals without incurring any
mailing expenses.37 Rule 14a-8 requires a company to “include a
shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in
its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting
of shareholders.”38 Proxy materials are sent out by management before a
shareholder meeting. The materials include items that will be voted on at
the meeting and also provide a mechanism for shareholders to vote by
proxy, that is, to make sure that their vote is counted even if they are
unable to attend the meeting. If a shareholder’s proposal must be
included in management’s proxy materials, management can choose to
state the reasons why it thinks that the other shareholders should vote
against the proposal.39 In any case, if the proposal is included in
management’s proxy, the cost of sending the proposal to the other
shareholders is borne by the corporation.40
To take advantage of the benefits of Rule 14a-8 submission,
shareholders must comply with a host of procedural requirements.41 First,
a proposal should state the shareholder’s recommendation or requirement
32

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2006). Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
governs shareholder proposals and was re-organized into a “Plain-English Question & Answer
Format” in 1998 to “make the rule easier for shareholders and companies to understand and follow.”
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, Investment
Company Act Release No. 23,200, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,106-07 (May 28, 1998) [hereinafter
1998 Adopted Changes Release].
33
See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Exchange Act, Release Number 4950, 18 Fed.
Reg. 6646, 6647 (Oct. 9, 1953) [hereinafter 1953 Proposed Changes Release].
34
See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654 (Del. Ch. 1988).
35
See Leslie Wayne, Shareholders Who Answer to a Higher C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2005, at C1.
36
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
37
Obviously, shareholders must still incur the cost of writing the proposal.
38
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
39
Id. § 240.14a-8(m).
40
Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 281.
41
See, e.g., id. § 240.14a-8(c); id. § 240.14a-8(d); id. § 240.14a-8(e).
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“as clearly as possible.”42 Second, the shareholder must prove that they
have held a certain amount of the company’s securities for at least one
year before the submission date and certify in writing that they intend to
continue to hold them through the shareholder meeting.43 Third,
shareholders may submit only one proposal per shareholder meeting.44
Fourth, proposals and supporting materials must be less than 500
words.45 Finally, the company must receive the proposal before the
deadline provided in the statute.46
Generally, any eligible shareholder’s proposal must be included
in the corporation’s proxy materials if the shareholder meets all of the
procedural requirements.47 But shareholder proposals may be omitted on
substantive grounds.48 If a corporation wishes to exclude a proposal on
substantive grounds, it must request a no-action letter from the
Commission before the corporation files its proxy statement and form of
proxy with the Commission.49 A no-action letter requests that the
Commission’s staff review whether the corporation’s exclusion of the
specific proposal would violate federal securities laws.50 While these
letters are merely the informal views of the Commission’s staff, they are
important because they are the interpretations of those who administer
the federal securities laws and are often the only statements about the
more obscure areas of these laws.51
42

Id. § 240.14a-8(a).
Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(1)-(2). The amount required is “at least $2,000 in market value, or
1% of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting.” Id. A registered
shareholder, one whose name is listed in the company’s records, is not required to demonstrate
eligibility because ownership can be verified by the company. Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(2). A nonregistered shareholder can demonstrate eligibility by obtaining and submitting a written statement
verifying continuous ownership from the record holder of the securities (i.e., from the broker or the
bank in whose name the security is held in trust). Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(2)(i).
44
Id. § 240.14a-8(c).
45
Id. § 240.14a-8(d).
46
See id. § 240.14a-8(e)(1).
47
Id. § 240.14a-8. When this Note refers to excluding or omitting and including
proposals, it means excluding or omitting the proposal from the company’s proxy statement.
48
Id. § 240.14a-8(i).
49
Id. § 240.14a-8(j)(1). The company must request the no-action letter at least 80
calendar days before it files is proxy statement, but if a company can show “good cause,” the
company may direct its no action letter request later than 80 days before filing its proxy statement
and form of proxy. Id.
50
SEC, NO ACTION LETTERS, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2009).
43

An individual or entity who is not certain whether a particular product, service, or action
would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may request a “no-action” letter
from the SEC staff. Most no-action letters describe the request, analyze the particular
facts and circumstances involved, discuss applicable laws and rules, and, if the staff
grants the request for no action, concludes that the SEC staff would not recommend that
the Commission take enforcement action against the requester based on the facts and
representations described in the individual’s or entity’s original letter.
Id.

51

See Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 1019, 1019 (1987).

2009]

LGBT NON-DISCRIMINATION THROUGH SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

1519

After a company requests a no-action letter, the Commission’s
staff will respond either favorably, adversely, or will refuse to respond
on the merits.52 In a favorable response, the staff will usually state that
they “will not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission
under a specific provision of law” if, in this case, a shareholder proposal
is omitted from the company’s proxy materials.53 A no-response on the
merits answer will occur if “the staff has indicated that legal, policy, or
practical considerations may make it appropriate for it to respond on the
merits of a no-action request.”54 Finally, an adverse response is one in
which the staff cannot say that it will not recommend enforcement
against to the Commission if the proposal is omitted.55 No-action letter
requests involving omission of shareholder proposals are directed to the
Division of Corporate Finance—the division that deals with the proxy
aspects of the 1934 Act.56
Most importantly, the no-action letter must be premised on one
of Rule 14a-8(i)’s enumerated exceptions.57 The Commission first
introduced the enumerated exceptions in 1948 to curb the submission of
proposals that “are not necessarily in the common interest of the
[company’s] security holders generally.”58 The exceptions are meant to
achieve this goal without “unduly restricting” shareholders’ rights to
submit shareholder proposals.59 Since the 1948 release, in which three
exceptions were created,60 ten other exceptions have been introduced.61
This Note focuses on the ordinary business operations exclusion.62

52

Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1032. Note that sometimes the staff will go further and explain its positions or
note which arguments the staff found persuasive. It may also qualify its opinion. Id..
54
Id. at 1033. For example, “the staff will not respond to requests involving issues or
parties that are the subject of an ongoing enforcement investigation or proceeding.” Id. at 1034.
55
Id. at 1035. In an adverse response, the staff is more likely to provide the reasoning
behind its position. Id.
56
Id. at 1024 n.22.
53

The . . . Division of Market Regulation is primarily responsible for processing those noaction requests under the 1934 Act dealing with the regulation of all aspects of the
securities exchanges and related facilities, while the . . . Division of Corporation Finance
is responsible for requests dealing with the proxy and other nonexchange aspects of the
1934 Act.
Id.

57

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2006).
Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 13 Fed. Reg. 6678, 6679
(Nov. 13, 1948) [hereinafter 1948 Adopted Changes Release].
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
17 C.F.R. § 240.14-8(i).
62
See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
58
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The “Ordinary Business Operations” Exclusion

One of the most common exceptions used by corporations is
Rule 14a-8(i)(7)’s “ordinary business operations” exclusion.63 Created in
1954, there have been a number of important changes to the exclusion
over time. First, the Commission has changed the exclusion’s language
over the years in order to clarify the situations in which it should be
used.64 In addition, the Commission introduced an exception to the
exclusion for proposals that raise significant social policy issues.65
Finally, the Commission developed a set of considerations that it uses to
determine whether a proposal relates to the company’s ordinary business
operations.66
1. The Exclusion’s Language
The Commission created the ordinary business operations
exclusion in a 1954 release67 to alleviate corporations from having to
include proposals when the subject matter of the proposal was “within
the province of the management.”68 The ordinary business operations
exclusion expressly clarifies that the board of directors controls matters
relating to a company’s ordinary business operations about which
shareholders should have no say, even through a shareholder proposal.69
Since its introduction, the Commission has attempted to change the
wording of the exclusion in order to clarify and provide guidance on the
63

See Proposals by Security Holders Notice of Proposed Amendments to Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 12,598, Investment Company Act Release No. 9345, 41 Fed. Reg.
29,982, 29,984 (July 20, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Proposed Changes Release]; Uhlenbrock, supra
note 27, at 279.
64
See 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,107; Adoption of
Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999,
Investment Company Act Release No. 9539, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Dec. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
1976 Adopted Changes Release]; Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 34-4979, 19
Fed. Reg. 246, 246 (Jan. 14, 1954) [hereinafter 1954 Adopted Changes Rule].
65
See 1976 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 52,998; see infra Part II.B.2.
66
See 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,108; 1976 Adopted Changes
Release, supra note 64, at 52,998; see infra Part II.B.3.
67
1954 Adopted Changes Rule, supra note 64, at 246.
68
1953 Proposed Changes Release, supra note 33, at 6647.
69
See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-19,135, 47 Fed. Reg.
47,420, 47,428-29 n.46 (Oct. 26, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Proposed Changes Release]. In creating the
new exclusion, the release notes that the new exclusion is a corollary of another exclusion, the
exclusion of proposals that are not proper subjects for action by shareholders under state law. See
1954 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 246.
Prior to 1954, many of the proposals included in proxy statements related to ordinary
business operations, despite the presence of state laws which generally provided that the
business and affairs of corporations shall be managed by their board of directors. In an
effort to provide more guidance in this area, the Commission amended the security holder
proposal rule to permit the exclusion of proposals relating to ordinary business.
1982 Proposed Changes release, supra, at 47,428-29 n.46.
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exclusion’s proper use. A brief overview of its evolution provides insight
into what the Commission considers the proper use to be.
The original language adopted in 1954 allowed a shareholder
proposal to be omitted if it was “a recommendation or request that the
management take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct
of the ordinary business operations of the issuer.”70 Since its introduction,
the Commission has never drastically changed the language. Under the
current regulations, a proposal may be excluded if it “deals with a matter
relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.”71
In 1976, the Commission suggested, but ultimately did not adopt,
a change that would have allowed a proposal to be omitted only if it dealt
with a “routine, day-to-day matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary
business operations of the issuer.”72 This new language, the Commission
asserted, would preserve a shareholder’s right to submit a proposal that
dealt with an important issue even if it involved the ordinary business of
the company.73 In 1998, the Commission suggested removing the term
“ordinary business” altogether because it was a “legal term of art that
provid[ed] little indication of the types of matters to which it refers.”74
The proposed language allowed a shareholder proposal to be omitted “if
the proposal relate[d] to specific business decisions normally left to the
discretion of management” and included a non-exclusive list of examples
of excludable proposals.75 Even though these changes were never

70

1954 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 247.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2006).
72
1976 Proposed Changes Release, supra note 63, at 29,984 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In order for companies to differentiate between important and routine issues, the
Commission proposed adding language that allowed companies to omit proposals dealing
“mundane” matters—matters that the board of directors ordinarily delegated to management—but
not proposals dealing with matters that require board action. Id.
73
Id.
74
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093,
Investment Company Act Release No. 22,828, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,685 (Sept. 26, 1997)
[hereinafter 1997 Proposed Changes Release].
75
1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,107. The non-exclusive list of
examples would be included in a note following the revised text of the exclusion in the statute:
71

Note to paragraph (i)(7): Examples of such matters include the way a newspaper formats
its stock tables, whether a company charges an annual fee for use of its credit card, the
wages a company pays its non-executive employees, and the way a company operates its
dividend reinvestment plan. For an investment company, such matters include the
decision whether to invest in the securities of a specific company.
1997 Proposed Changes Release, supra note 74, at 50,704. The Commission suggested that the
exclusion could even be clarified by merely adding additional guidance to the current language:
An example of this approach would be to revise [the] current paragraph . . . to permit
omission of a proposal “if it deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the company’s
ordinary business operations (matters that should be left to the discretion of the
company’s managers because of their complexity, impracticability of shareholder
participation, or relative insignificance).”
Id. at 50,685.
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adopted, they provide insight into how the Commission views this
exclusion.
2. The “Significant Social Policy” Exception to the Exclusion
In order to further clarify the proper use of the ordinary business
exclusion, the Commission created the “significant social policy”
exception to allow shareholder proposals that raise important issues76 to
be included in management’s proxy materials even when those issues
concern the company’s ordinary business.77 This section describes the
creation and evolution of the significant social policy exception, explains
its use, and explores the first attempt to use the significant social policy
to advance an LGBT non-discrimination shareholder proposal.
a. Basics of the Exception
In December 1976, the Commission introduced the “significant
social policy” exception to prevent the exclusion of shareholder
proposals that raise issues of “considerable importance” to the
shareholders78 by applying the ordinary business operations exclusion in
a “somewhat more flexible manner” than before.79 Under this more
flexible approach, proposals that have “significant policy, economic, or
other implications inherent in them” or those with other “major
implications” would not be excludable under the ordinary business
operations exclusion even if they raised ordinary business issues.80 The
Commission stated that the ordinary business operations exclusion
should only be applied to exclude proposals dealing with “mundane”
business matters and proposals without “any substantial policy or other
considerations.”81
Shareholder proposals that raise a significant social policy issue
can be either corporate governance proposals or social policy proposals.
Corporate governance proposals are those that relate to the governance of
the corporation.82 For example, a proposal requesting that a corporation
publish the names of shareholder-nominated candidates for director
positions next to any candidates nominated by the corporation’s board of
directors83 or a proposal seeking a bylaw amendment that would require a
76

The term “important issue” may seem nebulous, and it is. For a further discussion of
which issues are considered important, see infra Part II.B.2.c.
77
See 1976 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 52,998
78
See 1976 Proposed Changes Release, supra note 63, at 29,984.
79
1976 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 64, at 52,997-98.
80
See id. at 52,998.
81
Id. at 52,998.
82
PASSOFF, supra note 18, at 1.
83
See Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d
121, 123 (2d Cir. 2006).
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shareholder vote on the implementation of poison pills84 are both
examples of corporate governance proposals. Social policy shareholder
proposals are those whose subjects address social issues.85 Both types of
proposals have the potential to fall under the significant social policy
exception.
In addition, shareholders submit proposals relating to
employment decisions, particularly those dealing with employment
discrimination.86 It is relatively easy to understand why proposals
concerning simple employment decisions can and should be excluded
under the ordinary business operations exclusion. For example, it is
appropriate to allow a company to exclude proposals about employee
salaries because they go to the heart of the ordinary business exclusion.87
Management must constantly assess and adjust salary levels to attract
and retain employees.88 In addition, management is in a better position
than shareholders to make the decisions because shareholders, as a class,
do not have knowledge of all of the circumstances and facts informing
the decision and it would be impractical to seek a shareholder vote to set
each employee’s compensation.89
b. Cracker Barrel: The First LGBT Rights Shareholder Proposal
The first time that a shareholder used a proposal to urge LGBT
non-discrimination protection occurred in 1992 against Cracker Barrel,90
a restaurant chain based in Tennessee.91 In a 1991 company memo,
Cracker Barrel vice president for human resources William A. Bridges
84

See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 975 P.2d 907, 909 (Okla.
1999). Poison pills are mechanisms by which corporate boards attempt to protect their company
from a hostile take-over. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2186 (2008). Most poison pills are
provisions that state that shareholders have the right to purchase new shares of common stock,
triggered when a shareholder buys or attempts to buy a certain amount of the corporation’s stock. Id.
Since the triggering shareholder is not given the same right to purchase, that shareholder’s stake is
diluted. Id.
85
PASSOFF, supra note 18, at 1; see, e.g., Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432
F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (shareholder proposal
requesting that Dow stop selling napalm); Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers v. Wal-Mart
Stores, 821 F. Supp. 877, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
86
See e.g., Amalgamated Clothing, 821 F. Supp. at 879 (shareholder proposal requesting
that Wal-Mart distribute reports about equal employment and affirmative action).
87
See e.g., Union Bankshares Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851097, at *3 (Mar.
24, 2006) (proposal excludable under the ordinary business exclusion where it seeks to reduce the
increase in employee salaries and benefits over the next five years); Hydron Technologies, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 232587, at *2-*3 (May 8, 1997) (part of the proposal excludable under
the ordinary business exclusion where it seeks to cap annual employee salaries for all employees at
$100,000).
88
See, e.g., Union Bankshares Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 851097, at *3
(Mar. 24, 2006).
89
See, e.g., id.
90
See PASSOFF, supra note 18, at 6.
91
Gustav Niebuhr, Cracker Barrel Chain Angers Gay Groups with Written Policy—Firm
Briefly Adopted Rule Permitting the Dismissal of Homosexual Workers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1991,
at C11.
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announced that homosexuality was against the values upon which
Cracker Barrel was founded and to which its customers adhered.92
According to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Cracker Barrel
subsequently fired twelve gay and lesbian employees.93 After a public
backlash,94 Mr. Bridges released another memo rescinding the policy,95
although the fired employees were not rehired.96 In response, the New
York City Employees’ Retirement System (“NYCERS”),97 a Cracker
Barrel shareholder, requested that Cracker Barrel clarify its position on
the hiring of gay and lesbian employees.98 NYCERS was concerned
“about the potential negative impact on the company’s sales and
earnings, which could result from adverse public reaction, such as
organized boycotts and picketing of restaurants.”99 After receiving no
response from Cracker Barrel, NYCERS submitted a shareholder
proposal requesting that Cracker Barrel add “sexual orientation” as a
protected class to its non-discrimination policy.100
Cracker Barrel sought to exclude the proposal from its proxy
statement under the ordinary business operations exclusion by requesting
a no-action letter.101 In its no-action letter response, the Commission not
only agreed that the proposal could be excluded, but also outlined a new
far-reaching standard under which future no-action letter requests
regarding employment matters would be decided.102 The so-called
“Cracker Barrel Standard”103 stated that employment-based proposals104
would be treated as ordinary business decisions even if they raised
significant social policy issues and would therefore always be excludable
by corporations.105

92

Id.
Id.
94
The public backlash included protests, sit-ins, and boycotts at Cracker Barrel
restaurants in several states. See Peter T. Kilborn, Gay Rights Groups Take Aim at Restaurant Chain
That’s Hot on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1992, at A12.
95
See Niebuhr, supra note 91.
96
William Bunch, City Pension Fund Puts Gay Filings on Chain’s Menu, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 20, 1991, at 21.
97
NYCERS is an “institutional investor[] that routinely submit[s] employment-related
proposals to companies in which [it] owns stock.” New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 843
F. Supp. 858, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (NYCERS I), rev’d, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
98
Company Is Asked About Bias in Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at B4.
99
Id.
100
Cracker Barrel’s Policy on Gays Faces Action by New York Fund, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1991.
101
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j) (2006); see also note 49 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the steps a corporation must follow in order to exclude a shareholder proposal for one
of the substantive reasons provided in Rule 14a-8(i), see supra notes 57-62.
102
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 289095, at
*1-*2 (Oct. 13, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Cracker Barrel Letter].
103
See Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 280.
104
The bright-line rule did not exclude proposals that related to executive compensation.
Id. at *1.
105
Id. The letter specifically stated that:
93
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NYCERS challenged the no-action letter, first by unsuccessfully
seeking reversal from the Commission,106 and then by suing the
Commission in the Southern District of New York.107 NYCERS’ suit
argued that the Cracker Barrel Standard was unenforceable because the
Commission did not subject it to the “notice and comment” period
required by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and because the
Commission’s interpretation was “arbitrary and capricious.”108
Under the APA, agencies such as the Commission must subject
new or amended rules to a public “notice and comment” period unless,
among other things, the rule is merely interpretive.109 In addition, courts
can reverse “arbitrary [and] capricious” rules110 unless “the plaintiffs
have an adequate alternative legal remedy against someone else—a
remedy that offers the same relief the plaintiffs seek from the agency.”111
NYCERS prevailed when the district court held the Cracker
Barrel Standard invalid because it required a “notice and comment”
period under the APA.112 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit
reversed the lower court, holding that the Cracker Barrel Standard did
not have to determine whether the standard was “arbitrary and
capricious” because it concluded that plaintiffs had “an effective
alternative” of suiting Cracker Barrel, and could raise its arbitrary and
capricious argument in that suit.113 With its decision, the Second Circuit
solidified the Cracker Barrel Standard’s applicability to all shareholder
proposals dealing with employment matters—at least for a while.

[T]he fact that a shareholder proposal concerning a company’s employment policies and
practices for the general workforce is tied to a social issue will no longer be viewed as
removing the proposal from the realm of ordinary business operations of the registrant.
Rather, determinations with respect to any such proposals are properly governed by the
employment-based nature of the proposal.
Id.

106

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 11016, at *1
(Jan. 15, 1993).
107
New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (NYCERS I), 843 F.
Supp. 858, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
108
Id.
109
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006); NYCERS I, 843 F. Supp. at 872. The two other instances
in which a rule is not required to undergo notice and comment are if the rule is “a statement of
policy, or a rule regarding agency organization, procedure, or practice.” NYCERS I, 843 F. Supp. at
872; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
110
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
111
New York City Employee’s Ret. Sys. v. SEC (NYCERS II), 45 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1995).
112
NYCERS I, 843 F. Supp. at 881. “The APA requires agencies to provide an
opportunity for notice and comment prior to adoption or amendment of a rule, unless the rule is
interpretive, a statement of policy, or a rule regarding agency organization, procedure or practice.”
Id. at 872 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)).
113
NYCERS II, 45 F.3d at 14.
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3. The Ordinary Business Operations Test
In 1998, only six years after first announcing the Cracker Barrel
Standard, the Commission killed it, returning instead to analyzing each
no-action letter on a case-by-case basis.114 According to the Commission,
“the relative importance of certain social issues relating to employment
matters has reemerged as a consistent topic of widespread public
debate.”115 The Commission also noted that many shareholders were
interested in expressing their opinions to the corporations in which they
invest regarding employment issues that raise social policy issues.116
Since 1998, the Commission no longer automatically restricts
shareholders from submitting important employment-related proposals
designed to protect minority employees.117 The Commission’s change in
policy paved the way for the use of shareholder proposals’ as a nontraditional way to champion LGBT rights.
Even though proposals about LGBT non-discrimination are no
longer automatically excludable, they are far from automatically
includable. In order to determine whether a particular proposal will be
excludable, the Commission released the two “principal considerations”
under which the staff determines whether a proposal may be properly
omitted from a company’s proxy statement.118 Both considerations
involve subjective analysis.119
The first consideration involves the proposal’s subject matter,
recognizing that “[c]ertain tasks are so fundamental to management’s
ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that they could not, as a
practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder oversight.”120 “Examples
include the management of the workforce, such as the hiring, promotion,
and termination of employees, decisions on production quality and
quantity, and the retention of suppliers.”121
Importantly, the first consideration is also subject to the
aforementioned exception for proposals that raise “significant social
policy issues.”122 Therefore, even if a proposal concerned a subject matter
fundamental management decision-making, it would not be excludable if
it raised a significant social policy issue because it “transcend[s] the day-

114

See 1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,107-08.
Id. at 29,108.
116
See id.
117
See id. “Nearly all commenters from the shareholder community who addressed the
matter supported the reversal of this position. Most commenters from the corporate community did
not favor the proposal to reverse Cracker Barrel . . . .” Id. (citations omitted).
118
Id. at 29,108.
119
Uhlenbrock, supra note 27, at 298.
120
1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,108.
121
Id.
122
Id.
115
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to-day business matters and raise[s] policy issues so significant that it
would be appropriate for a shareholder vote.”123
The second consideration focuses on “the degree to which the
proposal seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the company by probing too deeply
into matters of a complex nature upon which shareholders, as a group,
would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.”124 The
Commission suggested that a proposal would be properly omitted from
proxy materials if it “involves intricate detail, or seeks to impose specific
time-frames or methods for implementing complex policies” but that the
Commission’s determinations will be made on a “case-by-case basis”
considering “factors such as the nature of the proposal and the
circumstances of the company to which it is directed.”125
Apache was decided under this two-part test.126 Recall that the
shareholder proposal submitted by The Funds listed ten principles to
which it wanted Apache to adhere in its employment practices.127 Judge
Gray Miller recognized that the proposal as a whole sought to affect
employment discrimination but found that three of its principles did not
implicate employment discrimination.128 Therefore, relying on the rule
that “the [p]roposal must be read with all of its parts,” Judge Miller
concluded that the proposal as a whole did not implicate a social policy
issue.129
Even though he already determined the case’s outcome—if the
proposal does not raise a significant social policy issue, it is excludable
under the ordinary business operations exclusion—the Judge addressed
the second consideration.130 He found that the proposal sought to
“micromanage the company to an unacceptable degree” because
shareholders would not be able to grasp the intricate workings of the
company.131

123

Id. The Commission’s example of a matter that raises a “sufficiently significant social
policy issue[]” is “significant discrimination matters.” Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 29,108-09. For example, timing might raise a significant social policy issue
where there is a great difference at issue or timing is of great importance. See id. at 29,109. The
Commission also clarified that not “all proposals seeking detail, or seeking to promote time-frames
or methods, necessarily amount[ed] to ‘ordinary business.’” Id.
126
Apache Corp. v. New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys., No. H-08-1064, 2008 WL
1821728, *4-*5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2008).
127
Id. at *1-*2; see supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
128
See Apache, 2008 WL 1821728, at *6. Interestingly, Judge Miller seemed to recognize
that the proposal—seeking LGBT non-discrimination in employment only—raised a significant
social policy issue when he said that “[the last four] principles do not implicate the social policy
underlying the Proposal.” See id.
129
Id.
130
See id.
131
Id.
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III.

SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS SEEKING LGBT NONDISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS ARE SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL
POLICY ISSUES

As discussed above, when a company seeks to omit a
shareholder proposal under the ordinary business exclusion, the
Commission’s staff will use the two-part test outlined in the 1998
Release to determine whether the exclusion will apply.132 In contrast to
the Commission’s and Judge Miller’s rulings in Apache, shareholder
proposals seeking non-discrimination protections based on sexual
orientation and gender identity and expression should not fall under Rule
14a-8(i)(7)’s ordinary business exclusion because they raise significant
social policy issues upon which shareholders are able to make an
informed judgment.
A.

LGBT Discrimination Is a Significant Social Policy Issue

This section argues that workplace discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity and expression is a significant
social policy issue that transcends day-to-day business matters and an
issue to which the ordinary business exclusion should not apply.133 First,
this section discusses that the Commission recognizes that whether a
particular issue raises a significant social policy changes with the
changing social climate.134 As a result, the Commission will reconsider
its earlier determinations and rule that issues it once found were not
indicative of significant social policy now rise to that category.135
Consequently, the Commission’s decisions on proposals for LGBT nondiscrimination policies can similarly be reexamined.136 It argues, second,
that in light of the current social climate, LGBT non-discrimination
protections should be regarded as a significant social policy issue.137
Finally, this section argues that LGBT workplace discrimination can take
many different forms, and therefore shareholder proposals seeking nondiscrimination in areas that affect workplace treatment should also be
excepted from the ordinary business exclusion.138

132

See infra Part II.B.3.
See supra note 123.
134
See Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice with Respect
to Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 12,599, Investment Company Act Release No.
9344, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,989, 29,991 (July 7, 1976) [hereinafter July 1976 Release]. For a more
detailed discussion, see infra Part III.A.1.
135
1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,108. For a more detailed
discussion, see infra Part III.A.1.
136
See infra note 141.
137
See infra Part III.A.2.
138
See infra Part III.A.2.
133
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1. Significant Social Policies Emerge from Changing Social
Attitudes
What is considered a significant social policy issue changes with
time. The Commission stated that its “views on certain issues may
change from time-to-time, in light of re-examination, new
considerations, or changing conditions which indicate that its earlier
views are no longer in keeping with the objectives of Rule 14a-8.”139
Specifically, the Commission’s staff changes its positions to “reflect[]
changing societal views . . . with respect to ‘social policy’ proposals
involving ordinary business.”140 This means that the fact that LGBT nondiscrimination is not currently a significant social policy issue in the eyes
of the Commission does not foreclose the possibility that the
Commission will later make such a determination.
Historically, several shareholder proposal issues that were
formerly excludable as ordinary business matters are now seen by the
Commission as non-excludable significant social policy issues.141 The
common thread through each example is that the issue raises a
widespread public debate.
For example, the Commission reconsidered and now holds as
non-excludable the issue whether to close or relocate a company
facility.142 Such reconsideration was prompted when a shareholder
submitted a proposal requesting that the Pacific Telesis Group study the
effects of closing company facilities on the communities in which those
facilities were located and to develop alternatives to alleviate the harm to
those communities.143 Pacific Telesis sought to exclude the proposal
under the ordinary business operations exclusion because the
Commission had consistently recognized that proposals dealing with
closing company facilities were ordinary business matters.144
139

July 1976 Release, supra note 134, at 86, 605.
1998 Adopted Changes Release, supra note 32, at 29,108.
141
See, e.g., Reebok Int’l Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 55815, at *1 (Mar. 16,
1992) [hereinafter Reebok Letter]; Transamerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 285806, at
*1 (Jan. 10, 1990) [hereinafter Transamerica Letter]; Pac. Telesis Group, SEC No-Action Letter,
1989 WL 245523, at *1 (Feb. 2, 1989) [hereinafter Pacific Telesis Letter].
142
See Pacific Telesis Letter, supra note 141, at *1.
143
Id.
144
Id. (citing Gen. Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 43005 (Jan. 29, 1988)).
The company also argued that even though the proposal sought a study, it still related to ordinary
business operations. Id. (citing Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218, 38,221,
(1983)).
140

[The SEC staff’s former position was] that proposals requesting issuers to prepare reports
on specific aspects of their business or to form special committees to study a segment of
their business would not be excludable under [the ordinary business exclusion]. Because
this interpretation raises form over substance and renders the provisions of [the ordinary
business exclusion] largely a nullity, the Commission has determined to adopt the
interpretative change set forth in the Proposing Release. Henceforth, the staff will
consider whether the subject matter of the special report or the committee involves a
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In its response, the Commission reconsidered its past treatment
of this issue and concluded that proposals about closing company
facilities could not be excluded if the proposals dealt “with the broad
social and economic impact” of the closings.145 The Commission held
that these proposals now raise significant social policy issues because of
the “heightened state and federal interest in the social and economic
implications” of closing corporate facilities.146
Another example of a reconsidered issue, which the Commission
reexamined in two decisions, is executive compensation.147 First, the
Commission recognized “golden parachute” payments148 as a significant
social policy issue149 when a shareholder submitted a proposal to
Transamerica Corp. requesting that the corporation disallow such
payments.150 While the Commission had previously held that golden
parachutes were ordinary business matters,151 it found these payments
rose to matters of significant social policy because Internal Revenue
Code interpretations had recently clarified the difference between golden
parachute payments and ordinary compensation and because there was a
current “public debate” about the implications of golden parachute
contracts.152 After recognizing that golden parachute payments were a
significant social policy issue, the Commission eventually concluded that
all executive compensation was a significant social policy issue153
because of the “widespread public debate” about the issue.154

matter of ordinary business; where it does, the proposal will be excludable under [the
ordinary business exclusion].
Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by
Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218, 38,220-21 (Aug. 23,
1983) [hereinafter 1983 Adopted Changes Release]. Note that Rule 14a-8(c)(7) is the precursor to
Rule 14a-8(i)(7). See 1998 Adopted Changes, supra note 32, at 29,120.
145
Pacific Telesis Letter, supra note 141. The Commission’s staff noted that proposals
dealing with the closing of specific corporate facilities would still be omitted as relating to ordinary
business operations. See id.
146
Id.
147
See Reebok Letter, supra note 141, at *1; Transamerica Letter, supra note 141, at *1.
148
Golden parachutes are payments that a corporate executive would receive if he or she
were to lose his or her job and usually apply when there is a change in company ownership (as
would be the case in a take-over). 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2181 (2008).
149
See Transamerica Letter, supra note 141, at *1.
150
See id.
151
See id. The company also argued that the proposal could be excluded because it would
violate state law (then Rule 14a-8(c)(2); now Rule 14a-8(i)(2)) and because it is contrary to the
Commission’s Proxy Rules and Regulations (then Rule 14a-8(c)(3); now Rule 14a-8(i)(3)). Id. at *4-*5.
152
Id. at *1. The Commission’s staff noted that proposals about ordinary executive
compensation would still be excludable as relating to ordinary business operations. Id.
153
Reebok Letter, supra note 141, at *1.
154
Id. at *1. In 1992, a Reebok shareholder submitted a proposal requesting that Reebok
establish a “Compensation Committee” composed entirely of independent directors to “evaluate and
establish executive compensation.” Id. Reebok sought to omit the proposal on the grounds that
executive compensation was an ordinary business matter. See id. at *3-*4. The Commission
reconsidered its position regarding executive and director compensation and determined that it was a
significant social policy issue. Id. at *1.
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2. “Changing Societal Views” and “Widespread Public Debate”
Issues relating to LGBT non-discrimination are currently some
of the most-discussed social issues. Across the country, issues relating to
sexual orientation and gender identity and expression have been part of
the public debate for the last several years. The public debate centers on
rights afforded (or taken away) from the LGBT community, including
marriage rights (including the debate about the differences between civil
unions, domestic partnerships, and marriage), rights incident to marriage
(including hospital visitation, survivorship rights, etc.), legal nondiscrimination protection (Civil Rights Act Protections), adoption rights,
and hate-crime legislation. Not only are all of these issues matters of
greater social policy debate, they are all matters of corporate policy, and
thus are proper issues for shareholders to raise in proposals.
Changing societal values can be seen in the increased acceptance
of LGBT individuals and non-discrimination protections155 and in the
increased visibility of the LGBT community in mainstream media and
entertainment.156 Newsweek’s public opinion polls show that support for
every area of LGBT equity has increased through the years.157 In
addition, public polls also show a changing societal view of the LGBT
community because support for every area of LGBT equality has
increased through the years.158 In 2008, 39% of Americans supported full
same-sex marriage equality, up 6% from 2004.159 But in 2008, 55%
supported some type of alternative legal union, up 15% from 2004.160
Support for same-sex couples’ rights to adopt children also increased 8%
to 53%.161 Finally, a whopping 73% of Americans support extending
health insurance and other employee benefits to gays and lesbians, up
13% from 2004.162
Increased acceptance of the LGBT community into mainstream
media and entertainment also evidences the change in societal values.163
Many of today’s most popular television shows and movies feature
LGBT characters that have developed characters that are not dissimilar in
complexity from the show’s heterosexual characters. Entertainment has
155

See Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampf, or, How America Overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick, even though Romer v. Evans Didn’t, 49 DUKE L.J. 1559, 1600 (2000) (arguing
“[c]hanges in social attitudes have already yielded important gains in gay civil rights generally”).
156
See id.
157
Arian Campo-Flores, A Gay Marriage Surge, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, Dec. 5,
2008, available at http://wwwnewsweek.com/id/172399 (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
158
See id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
See Michaelson, supra note 155 at 1600 (arguing that portrayal of LGBT characters in
the media “suggest[s] a sea change in the way gay families function and are depicted in American
cultural life”).
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come a long way from the first gay on-screen kiss to having transgender
characters.164
Even though “[c]hanges in societal attitudes have already yielded
important gains in [LGBT] civil rights generally,” there is still a very
widespread public debate about the validity of LGBT non-discrimination
protections.165 Justice Antonin Scalia recognized this widespread public
debate when he penned is dissent in Romer v. Evans,166 referring to the
debate as a “Kulturkampf” or culture war.167 And as Professor Jay
Michaelson put it, “it takes two to kulturkampf.”168 The continued fight
over non-discrimination protections show that the widespread public
debate is ongoing.169
No contemporary issue more clearly evidences the widespread
public debate about LGBT rights than the issue of same-sex marriage
equality. Same sex couples can get married in only four states to date,
Massachusetts,170 Connecticut,171 Iowa,172 and Vermont.173 A few other
states offer another form of recognition for same-sex couples such as
civil unions or domestic partnerships,174 but many gay-marriage
advocates claim that these unions are merely separate and unequal
alternatives to marriage.175 Furthermore, same-sex couples are denied the
1,049 federal benefits that heterosexual married couples enjoy because
federal law does not recognize same-sex marriages or unions.176 In
164

The first same-sex kiss on primetime television was between Kerr Smith and Adam
Kauffman on “Dawson’s Creek” in 2000. Don Chareunsy, EXTRA: The TV History of Gay Liplocks,
EXTRA, May 24, 2000, available at http://www.hollywood.com/news/EXTRA_The_TV_
History_of_Gay_Liplocks/312388. The first transgender character was on the soap-opera “All My
Children” in 2006. Dan J. Kroll, AMC introduces daytime’s first transgender character,
Soapcentral.com, Nov. 29, 2006, available at http://www.soapcentral.com/amc/news/2006/1127transgender.php?printonly=yes.
165
Michaelson, supra note 155 at 1600-03; id. at 1602 (“Gay men and lesbians are still
the object of intense social hostility . . . .”).
166
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
167
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168
Michaelson, supra note 155 at 1601.
169
See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intuition, Morals, and the Legal Conversation
About Gay Rights, 32 NOVA L. REV. 523 (2008).
170
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
Massachusetts could not deny marriage to same-sex couples).
171
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (holding that
marriage could not be withheld from same-sex couples).
172
Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, slip op. at 1 (Iowa Apr. 3, 2009) (holding an Iowa
statute limiting marriage to one man and woman unconstitutional).
173
Abby Goodnough & Anahad O’Connor, Vermont Legislature Legalizes Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009.
174
Human
Rights
Campaign,
Relationship
Recognition
in
the
U.S.,
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
175
See generally Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont’s Civil
Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate but (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113 (2000) (arguing
that civil unions will never be equal to marriage unless and until they are recognized by all other
states and the federal government).
176
Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Jan. 31, 1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf.
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addition, same-sex unions performed in states that provide for them do
not have to be recognized by other states,177 and currently New York
State is the only state that does not recognize same-sex marriage that will
recognize a same-sex marriage performed out-of-state.178
Marriage equality has taken a main stage in elections in the last
fifteen years.179 Public referendums amending state constitutions to
define marriage as between one man and one woman have swept the
country; to date, forty-two states’ constitutions or laws define marriage
in such way.180 Each of these elections involved frequent public debate
concerning the rights of LGBT citizens, and the 2008 fight over
California’s Proposition 8, a ballot measure that amended California’s
constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage, is a perfect example. The
campaign for Proposition 8 was heated, with spending on each side
totaling more than $75 million, making it “one of the most expensive
ballot measures ever waged.”181 Even after the measure passed, the social
debate continued. New activists emerged to mobilize supporters to repeal
the ban182 and supporters of LGBT rights turned out in massive numbers
to protest its passage in cities across the country.183 In California,
business owners complained about losing a substantial amount of samesex marriage business in the midst of a recession,184 while same-sex
marriage related business in Massachusetts was projected in 2008 to
result in 330 additional jobs and a $111 million economic boost for the
state over the next three years.185 Finally, Reverend Rick Warren, the
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pastor chosen to deliver the invocation at President Obama’s
inauguration, was harshly criticized for his support of Proposition 8.186
The debate over gay adoption also evidences the public debate
surrounding LBGT rights. For example, in 2008, Arkansas voters
approved a ballot measure to limit adoptions to only married couples
who live together.187 This measure was created with the intent of
prohibiting gay and lesbian adoption.188 On the other side of the debate, a
Florida Circuit Court held that Florida’s explicit ban on gay and lesbian
adoption was unconstitutional.189
The debate over employment discrimination also is indicative of
the public debate about LGBT rights. There is currently no federal law
banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity. Only twelve states provide such protection.190 That means that in
a whopping eighteen states anyone can lose their job simply because they
are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered.191 Corporate America,
however, has taken the lead in addressing the issue of LGBT nondiscrimination. Of the Fortune 500 companies, 88% provide protection
against discrimination based on sexual orientation and 25% provide it
based on gender identity.192
3. All LGBT Non-Discrimination Proposals Raise Significant
Social Policy Issues
Since the Commission analyzes no-action letter requests from
companies seeking to exclude proposals from their proxy statements on a
case-by-case basis, past no-action letters are not binding on future
Commission determinations.193 But since they are interpretations of the
Commission’s staff, they are still an important indication of what the
staff is thinking.194 In addition, proposals such as the one in Apache195
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sometimes request that non-discrimination extend to all areas of the
business, including charitable contributions, advertising, marketing, and
sale or purchase of goods and services.196 Since all of these specific nondiscrimination proposals raise significant social policy issues, all
proposals that request LGBT non-discrimination protections are
significant social policy issues and corporations should be required to
include them in the corporate proxy materials.
Proposals that deal with charitable contributions, a classic matter
of ordinary business operations, have been recognized by the
Commission’s staff as raising significant social policy issues.197 In 2008,
a Ford shareholder submitted a proposal requesting that Ford “list the
recipients of charitable contributions of $5000 or more on [its]
website.”198 Ford sought to exclude the proposal under the ordinary
business exclusion because the proposal was about “marketing and
public relations as they relate to charitable donations.”199 The
Commission, however, did not agree with Ford’s argument200 and the
proposal was subsequently included in Ford’s proxy materials.
The Commission has also recognized that a proposal requesting
that a corporation purchase from minority and female-owned suppliers
could not be excluded under the ordinary business operations exclusion
because “questions with respect to equal employment opportunity . . .
involve policy decisions beyond those personnel matters that constitute
the Company’s ordinary business.”201
Finally, there is also widespread public debate about sexual
orientation and advertising. Individuals and organizations on both sides
of the issue closely follow which companies advertise to the LGBT
community.202 These activists alert their supporters, often resulting in a
national debate about certain companies’ advertising policies.203 The
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national debate is usually expressed when activists instigate company
boycotts.204
B.

LGBT Non-Discrimination Proposals Do Not Seek to
Micromanage Corporations

In addition to raising significant social policy issues, LGBT nondiscrimination proposals do not exhibit any characteristics of
micromanagement. The second consideration the Commission uses to
determine if the ordinary business operations exclusion will apply to a
particular proposal is the degree to which a proposal “seeks to
micromanage the company.”205 The Commission explicitly stated that
proposals will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, but “some proposals
may intrude unduly on a company’s ‘ordinary business’ operations by
virtue of the level of detail that they seek.”206
When introducing the test, the Commission cited four examples
of shareholder proposals that sought to micromanage a corporation.207
Each of these four proposals differs radically from a proposal that merely
seeks protection of LGBT rights, such as those that The Funds proposed
that Apache adopt in 2008. Since LGBT non-discrimination proposals do
not micromanage in the way that the Commission intended, companies
should be required to include these proposals in their proxy materials.
The first proposal that the Commission cited as an example of
micromanagement was submitted to Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (“Capital
Cities”).208 There, the shareholders requested that the corporation create a
report for shareholders detailing several of the corporation’s affirmative
action policies.209 Among other things, the proposal requested “[a]
summary of Affirmative Action Programs and timetables to improve
performance . . . and a description of major problems in meeting the
network’s goals.”210 The Commission agreed with Capital Cities that the
proposal could be omitted from Capital Cities’ proxy materials under the
ordinary business operations exclusion.211
The Commission’s second example was a proposal submitted to
Templeton Dragon Fund, Inc. (“Templeton”).212 The proposal requested
that Templeton’s board create a corporate policy that required them to
“make annual offers to repurchase at least 5%, and up to 25% of its
204
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outstanding shares at net asset value commencing with an initial
repurchase of 25% of its outstanding shares.”213 The Commission agreed
with Templeton that it could exclude the proposal under the ordinary
business operations because the proposal was too intricate.214
Third, the Commission cited a proposal requesting that
Burlington Northern Railroad report “what corporate funds have been
expended to date on [the development of a new technology] . . .
specifically what has been accomplished in the way of hardware and
software development, systems testing, added personnel requirements for
future maintenance,” the status of the technological development, the
corporation’s “intent[ions] to continue the project,” the cost at which it
intends to continue the project, and when the corporation expects the
project to be completed.215 Again, the Commission agreed with
Burlington Northern that the proposal could be excluded under the
ordinary business operations exclusion.216
Finally, the Commission’s last example of micromanagement
was a proposal to Du Pont requesting that the corporation “[r]apidly
accelerate plans to phase out [chlorofluorocarbon (“CFC”)] and halon
production . . . [and] . . . report to shareholders within six months . . .
research and development program expenditures which dramatically
increase efforts to find CFC and halon substitutes.”217 The Commission
agreed with Du Pont that the proposal could be excluded from Du Pont’s
proxy materials because the proposal related to the corporation’s
ordinary business operations.218 In addition, the D.C. Circuit Court
clarified, in an opinion written by soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, that the problem with the proposal was that it
“relates not to whether CFC production should be phased out, but when
the phase out should be completed.”219
In contrast to the examples of shareholder micromanagement,
proposals such as The Fund’s proposal to Apache merely ask that the
corporation include a classification of people to its already existing nondiscrimination policy. The proposals above either provide detailed
instructions to corporate management or set specific timelines in which
management must complete the request. Unlike the Capital Cities
proposal, non-discrimination proposals do not ask for the corporation to
provide a report to shareholders, especially one that requires summaries,
tables, and descriptions. Unlike the Templeton proposal, nondiscrimination proposals do not specify percentages, limits, or
213
214
215
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thresholds, instead they merely request that the corporation not
discriminate. Unlike the Burlington Northern proposal, nondiscrimination proposals do not ask for information regarding the use of
corporate funds, specific statuses of projects, management intentions, or
management expectations. Finally, unlike the Du Pont proposal, nondiscrimination proposals do not ask for the corporation to complete the
proposal within a certain time period or provide corporate expenditure
reports.
Unlike the Commission’s examples of micromanagement, nondiscrimination proposals are not complicated. They do not seek to
impose time limitations, nor are they intricate. These proposals are
simple and straightforward. Therefore, shareholders should be able and
entitled to review and vote on these proposals.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Shareholders can use the shareholder proposal process provided
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to suggest that the corporations in
which they invest add LGBT non-discrimination policies. In response,
the corporations can attempt to exclude the proposal from their proxy
materials under the ordinary business operations exclusion. Shareholder
proposals that seek LGBT non-discrimination protections should never
be excludable because they raise significant social policy issues and do
not seek to micromanage the corporation.
American society’s acceptance of the LGBT community has
been increasing and it is clear that societal views towards LGBT rights
have been changing, too. These changing societal views have also
contributed to the public debate about LGBT rights. Moreover, recent
political and legal events also evidence the public debate. Finally,
proposals seeking LGBT rights do not seek to micromanage
corporations; they are straightforward and simple.
If the Commission expanded the significant social policy
exception to LGBT non-discrimination policies, concerned shareholders
would be better able to influence corporations to recognize the value of
all employees. But even without the significant social policy’s help,
activist shareholders are still successful. As mentioned above, many
corporations faced with these proposals acquiesce and add nondiscrimination protection.
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